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PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY OF CORPORATE AND 
INDIVIDUAL FARMS IN UKRAINE 
 
Zvi Lerman and David J. Sedik 
 
Abstract 
The paper presents a comparative analysis of the productivity of corporate and individual 
farms in Ukraine based primarily on cross-section data from a farm survey conducted by FAO in 
2005. We calculate partial land and labor productivity, total factor productivity, and technical 
efficiency scores (using Stochastic Frontier Analysis) for farms of different organizational forms. 
Our results demonstrate with considerable confidence that, contrary to established convictions 
among the Ukrainian decision makers, the large corporate farms are not more productive than the 
smaller family farms. This finding is not restricted to Ukraine, as a similar result has been 
obtained by in Moldova, Russia, and the U.S. Policies encouraging a shift from large corporate 
farms to smaller individual farms, rather than the reverse, can be expected to produce beneficial 
results for Ukrainian agriculture and the economy in general. The government of Ukraine should 
abandon its inherited preference for large-scale corporate farms and concentrate on policies to 
improve the operating conditions for small individual farms. At the very least, the government 
should ensure a level playing field for farms of all sizes and organizational forms, and desist 
from biasing its policies in favor of large farms.  
Keywords: family farms, corporate farms, comparative performance, technical efficiency, total 
factor productivity, agrarian reforms, transition countries. 




One of the items on the agricultural reform agenda in former Soviet republics forming the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS)  involves  transformation  from  the  traditional 
corporate  farms  to  substantially  smaller  family  or  individual  farms.  This  transformation  is 
motivated by  the theoretical  incentive analysis  of farms of different  organizational  forms in 
market economies, which suggests that family farms can be expected to achieve higher levels of 
productivity and efficiency than corporate farms (Allen and Lueck 2002). Although Ukraine 
embarked on a course of transition to a market economy back in 1991, the first decade was 
largely characterized by political indecision and lacked clear strategic focus (Lerman and Csaki 
2000). Agricultural land was privatized, but only in the form of paper certificates of ownership, 
without actual distribution of physical plots to rural families. It is only in 2000 that sufficient 
political resolve was mustered to initiate sweeping conversion of these paper certificates into 
physical plots. As a result the share of agricultural land in individual use increased dramatically 
from about 15% in the late 1990s to 45% in 2005.  
Despite  the  impressive  progress  with  family  farming,  the  large  corporate  farms  –  a 
carryover from the Soviet era – still control more than half the agricultural land in Ukraine. 
Comparison of farm structure in Ukraine and in typical market economies shows that Ukraine is 
characterized by much greater land concentration in large corporate farms than the United States 
or any of the EU-15 countries. The Soviet agricultural ideology, which was driven, among other 
factors, by expectations of economies  of scale, is  still deeply implanted in  the minds  of all 
agricultural  decision  makers,  regardless  of  their  declared  dedication  to  market  economy 
principles. This ideology accounts for the widespread bias in favor of corporate farms and the 
emphasis on so-called “horizontal transformation”, which aspires to make persistently inefficient 4 
 
corporate farms suddenly efficient. Yet the experience of the last 15 years in all former Soviet 
republics shows conclusively that the attempts to preserve the large-scale corporate structures 
(whether as agricultural cooperatives or as new corporations with market-sounding names) have 
not produced any positive results. On the contrary, it is the three small countries that resolutely 
abandoned the large-scale corporate structures and made a clean shift to small-scale individual 
agriculture – Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan – that demonstrate the most impressive recovery 
record among the CIS countries in recent years (Lerman 2004). Ukraine itself is beginning to 
show signs of agricultural recovery in response to the changes in farm structure since 2000.  
This paper attempts to inform the ongoing policy debate between the supporters of large 
corporate  farms  and  the  supporters  of  smaller  family  farms  in  CIS.  The  paper  presents  a 
comparative analysis of the productivity of corporate and individual farms in Ukraine based 
primarily on cross-section data from a survey of 1,400 respondents conducted in 2005 by the 
United  Nations  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  (FAO)  with  local  support.  We  calculate 
partial land and labor productivity, total factor productivity (based on both accounting data and 
the production function approach), and technical efficiency scores (using a Stochastic Frontier 
algorithm) for farms of two main organizational  forms: large  corporate farms  and relatively 
small family farms.  
Our results unfortunately do not demonstrate clear-cut performance differences between 
corporate  and  individual  farms,  in  part  because  in  some  analyses  the  individual  sector  is 
represented  only  by  peasant  farms,  whereas  household  plots  –  the  main  component  of  the 
individual  sector  –  are  excluded  due  to  missing  data.  Yet  our  results  do  demonstrate  with 
considerable confidence that, contrary to established convictions among the Ukrainian decision 
makers,  the  large  corporate  farms  are  not  more  productive  than  the  smaller  family  farms. 5 
 
Moreover, the very small household plots – a major component of the individual farm sector – 
are resoundingly more productive than the large corporate farms. These findings for Ukraine are 
consistent with recent results for Moldova (Lerman and Sutton, 2006), Russia (Brock et al., 
2007), and the United States (Ahearn et al., 2002), all of which demonstrate that large corporate 
farms do not perform better than small family farms. We do not observe economies of size 
among Ukrainian farms, just as we do not observed economies of size for farms in other CIS 
countries and in the United States.  
Changing Farm Structure in Ukraine 
The collective and state farms that dominated Ukraine‟s farm sector for decades during 
the Soviet era were notoriously inefficient (Lerman et al. 2004). The need for the reorganization 
of the traditional “farm enterprises” in the interest of improved productivity was recognized long 
before Ukraine became independent, and the country began the process of agrarian reform in 
March 1991, six months prior to the declaration of independence from the Soviet Union. The 
first  Land  Code  of  independent  Ukraine  passed  in  March  1992  included  provisions  for 
privatization of state land, abolishing exclusive state ownership, and the mechanisms for the 
division of the privatized land into individual land shares were finalized by presidential decree in 
August 1995.  
Share-based privatization (similar to that in Russia) did not actually allocate land use 
rights  to  individuals.  Rural  residents  received  paper  certificates  of  landownership  (“land 
shares”),  without  physically  getting  a  plot  of  land,  and  certificate  holders  were  allowed  to 
convert the land share into a private plot when leaving the former collective. By December 1999 
more than 6 million rural residents had received paper certificates confirming their entitlement to 
a plot of land of a specified size (4.2 hectares on average) but in an unspecified location. The 6 
 
non-land assets (farm machinery, buildings, livestock) had been divided into value-based paper 
shares. The collective (now transformed into a corporate farm) was no longer a closed entity, as 
it had been during the Soviet era, and individuals were entitled to leave the collective taking their 
shares of land and assets with them. Yet very few corporate farms distributed land and assets in 
kind to the shareowners and few farm employees left the large farms for independent farming. 
The land and asset shares typically remained locked in collective ownership and use. 
Share privatization did not encourage large farms to change their mode of operation by 
reducing costs (share privatization often resulted in only “changing the sign on the door”), nor 
did  it eliminate the soft budget  constraints  implicit in  government  policies toward the large 
farms. Most importantly, perhaps, it did not resolve the barriers to exit from large corporate 
farms. Neither farm directors nor shareowners generally supported allowing other members to 
leave  the  farm.  Many  details  of  the  exit  procedure  (allocation  of  land  and  asset  shares,  the 
methodology of identification of concrete plots of land and division of large farm assets) were 
worked out only years after the initial decrees authorizing farm exit. The relatively unfavorable 
conditions for individual farmers in matters of access to capital, inputs, and markets compared to 
agricultural enterprises dissuaded many from exiting the corporate farms.  
For these reasons, the first-wave reforms implemented throughout the 1990s failed to 
produce the expected improvements in agricultural productivity and efficiency, and the second 
phase of agricultural reforms was launched by President Leonid Kuchma in December 1999 
(Decree  1999).  The  1999  presidential  decree  essentially  forced  the  conversion  of  the  share 
certificates into physical land plots, which could then be withdrawn by a simplified procedure 
and used to establish a new individual farm or to enlarge an existing household plot. Corporate 7 
 
farms could continue to use the privatized land only if they signed a formal lease contract with 
the landowners.  
The second-wave land reform achieved some very important results for rural residents. 
First, nearly 7 million rural residents became owners of physical land plots (4.2 hectares on 
average), not just paper shares. About 70% of agricultural land, or 80% of arable land, is now 
physically owned by rural individuals. Ukraine evolved from exclusive state ownership of land 
in 1990 to a mix of state and collective ownership in 1993-95 and finally to a mix of state and 
private land ownership in 2000-05. The land ownership structure seems to have stabilized since 
2000 with roughly one-half remaining in state ownership and one-half transferred to private 
ownership.  
Table 1. Agricultural land by farm type (thousand hectares and percent) 
 




















1990  42,030  39,357  2,669    93.6  6.4  0.0  6.4 
1991  41,973  38,061  3,864    90.7  9.2  0.1  9.3 
1992  41,930  36,747  4,833    87.6  11.5  0.8  12.4 
1993  41,890  36,260  5,011    86.6  12.0  1.5  13.4 
1994  41,862  35,764  5,357  741  85.4  12.8  1.8  14.6 
1995  41,853  35,442  5,589  822  84.7  13.4  2.0  15.3 
1996  41,840  35,240  5,694  906  84.2  13.6  2.2  15.8 
1997  41,854  35,029  5,789  1,037  83.7  13.8  2.5  16.3 
1998  41,827  34,806  5,919  1,102  83.2  14.2  2.6  16.8 
1999  41,829  34,408  6,243  1,178  82.3  14.9  2.8  17.7 
2000  41,827  30,941  8,543  2,342  74.0  20.4  5.6  26.0 
2001  41,817  29,327  9,736  2,754  70.1  23.3  6.6  29.9 
2002  41,800  27,940  10,939  2,921  66.8  26.2  7.0  33.2 
2003  41,789  25,826  12,799  3,164  61.8  30.6  7.6  38.2 
2004  41,764  24,524  13,819  3,421  58.7  33.1  8.2  41.3 
Source: Derzhkomzem (various years).  
 
The two reform  waves  have produced a significant  redistribution of agricultural  land 
between the individual and the corporate sectors of Ukrainian agriculture. The land holdings of 
the corporate sector consisting of former collective and state farms steadily shrunk between 1990 
and 2004, while the individual sector grew by absorbing land from corporate farms (Figure 1). 8 
 
The transfer of agricultural  land from  corporate to  individual farms accelerated markedly in 
1999. Thus, the share of the individual sector (household plots and peasant farms combined) in 
agricultural land use increased from 6% in 1990 to 17% in 1998 and then soared to 41% in 2004 
(Table 1). The share of corporate farms decreased correspondingly from 94% of agricultural 
land use in 1990 to 59% in 2004. The increased share of individual farms in land use is reflected 
in increased holdings because the total agricultural land in Ukraine has remained constant at 42 
million hectares.  
    
Figure 1. Agricultural land (top panel) and gross agricultural product in constant prices (bottom panel) by farm type 
in Ukraine, 1990-2004. Source: AgUkraine 2006. 
 
  The 1999 decree has dramatically changed the face of Ukrainian agriculture (Figure 1). 
From agriculture with predominant concentration of production in collective farms it has evolved 
























into agriculture characterized by the clear dominance of individual farms. The individual sector 
(consisting of the traditional household plots and the independent peasant farms that began to 
emerge  after 1992)  controls  today more than 40% of agricultural  land, contributing 70% of 
agricultural output. Within the individual sector, the main contribution to agricultural production 
is from household plots, not peasant farms, as they also control much more land (33% versus 
8%).  
Ukrainian  farms  today  can  be  classified  into  two  broad  organizational  categories: 
individual farms and corporate farms (the latter are often called “agricultural enterprises”). The 
individual sector is subdivided into household plots and peasant farms. These are typical family 
farms  and  the  main  difference  between  them  is  one  of  size  and  commercial  orientation. 
Household plots are generally smaller and more subsistence-oriented than peasant farms, but 
they  sell  their  surplus  products  and  thus  augment  the  family  income  with  sales  revenue. 
Individual farms operate mainly on family-owned land, although growth is achieved by leasing 
additional land from other owners. The corporate sector consists of relatively large farms that 
have replaced the traditional collective and state farms in the process of reform since 1992. They 
are organized as private corporations with two or more shareholders (some farms have as many 
as 1,600 shareholders according to the 2005 FAO survey) that operate mainly on leased land and 
have strong commercial orientation.  
  The size of holdings in the individual sector has increased remarkably as a result of the 
1999 reform. The average size of a family (peasant) farm increased from 25-30 ha in 1998 to 70-
80 ha in 2003-2004. The share of peasant farms in agricultural land doubled from 2-3% in 1995-
99 to 6% in 2000 and continued to rise to 8% in 2003-2004. The average size of household plots 
grew from about 1 hectare in 1998 to 2.5 hectares in 2004 as their share in agricultural land 10 
 
increased from 15% to 35%. The substantial increase in total land cultivated in household plots 
and their average size since 2000 is the direct outcome of the 1999 Presidential Decree, which 
made it possible for many rural residents to take their land share out of the former collective and 
use  it  to  augment  the  traditional  household  plot  (instead  of  establishing  a  peasant  farm,  as 
originally envisaged). 
  The  increase  of  landholding  in  the  individual  sector  has  been  complemented  by  a 
decrease in the landholding in corporate farms as well as an increase in the number of corporate 
farms. The average size of a corporate farm in Ukraine has fallen from 3,000 ha in 1990 to 2,000 
ha in 1998 to 1,000 ha in 2004. Corporate farms are now mainly represented by limited liability 
companies and private lease enterprises (the latter accounting for almost 25% of the total number 
of corporate farms in Ukraine). While the number of shareholders in corporate farms ranges from 
1 to 1,600, fully 16% are single-shareholder entities and 31% have from 1 to 3 shareholders only.  
  Despite these changes, there remain important differences in the size distribution of farms 
in Ukraine and in market economies. First, the average size a household farm in Ukraine (2.5 
hectares) is much smaller than the average family farm in market economies (130 hectares in 
land-rich United States, 20 hectares in EU-15). Second, the average size of a corporate farm in 
Ukraine (around 1000 ha) is still quite a bit larger than the average size of farms in the EU and 
the United States. Even non-family corporate farms in land rich United States (about 0.3% of 
farms using 1.0% of land in farms) are on average only 533 ha in size (USDA/NASS 2004). 
Though there has been an impressive fall in the average size of corporate farms in Ukraine 
particularly since 1999, there is still some way to go before the size of Ukrainian corporate farms 
becomes consistent with farm sizes in market economies. As a result of these differences, the 
concentration of land use in Ukraine continues to deviate substantially from that in established 11 
 
market economies: it is still characterized by Soviet-era duality, with a large number of very 
small farms controlling a minute proportion of agricultural land and a very small number of large 
farms controlling a disproportionately large land area. 
 
Farm Productivity: Prior Hypotheses 
Productivity is the output produced per unit of resource used, and it is accordingly a 
measure of the efficiency with which producers use available resources. Productivity measures 
are at the core of the discussion of the impact of reforms in transition countries, as efficiency 
improvement was the main motivation for the shift from the centrally controlled socialist 
economy to the market economy. The main manifestation of market reforms in Ukraine and 
other CIS countries involves a shift from traditional corporate farms to new individual farms, and 
the study accordingly focuses on a comparison of productivity measures for corporate and 
individual farms.  
We distinguish between partial productivity measures, when output is measured in 
relation to a single input (land, labor, machines) and total factor productivity (TFP), when output 
is measured in relation to a whole bundle of inputs used. In partial productivity measures the 
resource inputs are typically in physical units (hectares of land, number of workers, number of 
tractors or harvesters), whereas in TFP the different inputs are aggregated into a single bundle in 
money units. Aggregate output (the sum total of commodities produced) is expressed in units of 
value (although in some partial productivity calculations the specific commodity outputs may be 
expressed in physical units).  
In addition to partial and total factor productivity, technical efficiency is often used to 
evaluate farm performance. Technical efficiency (TE) essentially measures the distance of a 
particular farm from the production frontier (the locus of points that represent the maximum 12 
 
attainable output for a given basket of inputs or, conversely, the minimum basket of inputs 
required to attain a given output).  
Our prior hypotheses regarding productivity and technical efficiency measures used in 
this study are suggested by the available literature and theory. For partial productivity measures, 
our prior hypothesis is that individual farms (household plots and peasant farms combined) 
achieve higher productivity of land and lower productivity of labor than corporate farms. Higher 
productivity of land is usually attributed to greater incentives in the individual form of 
organization, while lower productivity of labor is associated with the tendency of individual 
farms to absorb labor (the “labor sink” effect of individual farms, see Lerman and 
Schreinemachers (2005)). The potential ambiguity in performance ranking by partial 
productivity measures is expected to be resolved by TFP. Our prior hypothesis for total factor 
productivity is that individual farms achieve higher TFP than corporate farms, primarily due to 
differences in incentives between the two forms of farm organization. For technical efficiency 
our prior hypothesis is again that individual farms achieve higher TE scores that corporate farms 
for the same reasons. 
The various productivity measures and technical efficiency scores of corporate and 
individual farms in Ukraine are calculated using cross-section data from a survey of corporate 
and individual farms conducted in 2005 by FAO in cooperation with local counterparts (the 2005 
FAO survey).  
 
Partial Productivity of Land and Labor 
We calculate the partial productivity measures as value of output per hectare of land 
(partial productivity of agricultural land) and value of output per worker (partial productivity of 13 
 
agricultural labor).
1 In accordance with our prior hypothesis, we expect the three organizational 
forms to be ranked by output per hectare in the order household plots > peasant farms > 
corporate farms. The actual results for the productivity of land in farms of different types are 
presented in Table 2. Household plots outperform both peasant farms and corporate farms by 
partial productivity of land (parametric t-test for means, nonparametric Wilcoxon test for 
medians). The differences between corporate farms and peasant farms are not statistically 
significant (both tests). The survey thus produces the ranking household plots > peasant farms ≈ 
corporate farms by partial productivity of land. 
Table 2. Partial productivity of land and labor in farms of different types 




Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Corporate farms  4.4  0.9  17.4  12.5 
Peasant farms  4.8  1.0  11.7  5.9 
Household plots  11.8  5.0  --  -- 
All sample farms  8.8  2.3  14.0  8.1 
 
Partial productivity of agricultural labor was calculated only for corporate and peasant 
farms, as the number of farm workers could not be reliably estimated for household plots. While 
the productivity of land is comparable for corporate and peasant farms, the productivity of labor 
(Table 2) is significantly higher for corporate farms (as expected). This is consistent with the 
“labor sink” effect of individual farms: in Ukraine peasant farms surveyed employ nearly 30 
workers per 100 hectares compared with less than 20 workers per 100 hectares in corporate 
farms. 
                                                 
1 Partial productivity of land was also calculated in terms of crop yields in physical units (kg per hectare). Because 
of the large number of commodities involved (16 different crops), the comparison results for farms of different 
forms are not clear-cut, but judging overall (“by majority”) household plots are doing better than either corporate or 
peasant farms. On the other hand, corporate and peasant farms overall achieve comparable crop yields. Milk yields – 
a partial productivity measure for livestock – are lower for corporate farms than for individual farms (2,600 kg per 
cow per year compared with 3,750 kg per cow per year), but there are no statistically significant differences between 
the two components of the individual sector (household plots and peasant farms). 
 14 
 
The partial productivity of land decreases with farm size (Table 3). The decrease is 
particularly strong for the small household plots and levels out for the larger peasant farms and 
corporate farms. Yet for these larger farms also the size coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant. Thus, in a regression framework, large farms have significantly lower land 
productivity than smaller farms even when the comparison excludes household plots and is 
restricted to peasant farms and corporate farms only. The partial productivity of labor, on the 
other hand, increases with farm size, rising significantly from the smaller peasant farms to the 
larger corporate farms (no labor data for household plots).  
Table 3. Regression coefficients for land productivity and labor productivity versus farm size 
  All three farms types  Household plots only  Peasant and corporate 
farms 
Land productivity  −0.292  −0.508  −0.092 
Labor productivity  --  --  +0.265 
Note: All coefficients statistically significant at p < 0.01. 
 
Figure 2 shows the output per hectare as a function of size for all three farm types. It 
visually demonstrates the results of Table 2, where household plots > peasant farms ≈ corporate 
farms. On average household plots have higher land productivity than peasant and corporate 
farms, but the regression results in Table 3 show that land productivity decreases with size also 
in the subsample of peasant and corporate farms (the relatively flat right-hand tail of the 
scattergram in Figure 2). 
 15 
 
Figure 2. Output per hectare as a function of farm size (in logged variables). Source: 2005 FAO survey. 
 
 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
The two partial productivity measures for land and labor do not give a consistent picture: 
individual farms have a higher productivity of land and a lower productivity of labor. This 
ambiguity can be resolved by switching from partial productivity measures (each calculated for a 
single input) to total factor productivity (TFP), which is calculated as the ratio of the aggregated 
value of output to the aggregated cost of input use. The theoretical formula for the aggregated 
cost of input use calls for multiplying the quantity of each input by its market price and summing 
all the input cost components. This is a truly formidable undertaking in most cases, and a naïve 
method equates input costs to production costs as reported in the farm‟s financial statements. The 
ratio of sales to costs is a TFP proxy that provides a strictly accounting measure of productivity 
and is in fact equivalent to profit margin. 
The well-known accounting valuation biases can be avoided even in the absence of 
market prices for valuing the cost of inputs (such as the price of land). A theoretically more 16 
 
sound approach is to determine TFP by estimating a production function and then using the 
estimated input coefficients as the weights to calculate the value of the bundle of inputs. The 
ratio of the observed output to the estimated bundle of inputs is the TFP. This measure does not 
use accounting data and does not require knowledge of market prices.  
In principle, the production function should be estimated for all the relevant inputs. In 
farm surveys, however, the proliferation of missing values dramatically reduces the number of 
valid cases that can be used for estimation as the number of inputs is increased. The problem is 
especially acute because the standard Cobb-Douglas production function is estimated in 
logarithms, which are undefined whenever the corresponding input is zero. In total, there are 518 
observations of corporate and peasant farms in the survey database. Of these 507 observations 
have valid data on agricultural land and agricultural labor, but only 399 cases have data for the 
value of production – the dependent variable in production function estimation. This maximum 
number of observations (399) is actually available for estimating two-input production functions 
with land and labor as the only inputs. However, the number of valid observations is reduced 
from 399 to 371 if in addition to land and labor we also include farm machinery, to 302 if we add 
fertilizers to the list of inputs, and to 283 if both fertilizers and diesel fuel are included. Thus, 
with merely 5 inputs – land, labor, machinery, fertilizer, and diesel fuel – we lose 30% of the 
potential number of observations (399). Data shrinkage is even more dramatic if we include the 
number of animals as an input: production function estimation using land, labor, farm machinery 
and animals is based on as few as 207 observations. 
In the general economic literature, TFP is typically calculated assuming two inputs: 
capital and labor (see, e.g., Jones, 1998, pp. 41-42). We have decided to follow a modification of 
the same approach from considerations of data availability and reliability. In our estimations 17 
 
labor is taken as the physical number of agricultural workers reported in the survey (in 
preferences to salaries) while capital is proxied by two physical variables: agricultural land (in 
hectares) and the aggregated number of pieces of farm machinery (in preference to the highly 
uncertain balance sheet value of machinery). The livestock herd was excluded from the capital 
component because of the large number of farms without animals. We thus estimated the 
production function with three inputs: labor, land, and farm machinery. A separate estimation 
was additionally carried out for the subgroup of farms with animals. The physical variables were 
judged to be much more reliable and consistent than the accounting figures reported for other 
factors of production, such as the cost of purchased inputs and the value of fixed assets 
(especially for individual farms).  
 
Accounting-Based TFP 
The survey provided fairly detailed accounting information on production costs for both 
corporate and peasant farms (no cost data were available for household plots). Corporate farms 
reported the production costs from their profit-and-loss statement. Total production costs in 
corporate farms included the cost of material inputs, labor costs, depreciation, and other costs. 
Peasant farmers, on the other hand, reconstructed mainly their material costs (including lease 
payments and taxes), but did not show labor costs or depreciation. To achieve comparability of 
the cost figures, the costs for corporate farms were adjusted to reflect only the cost of material 
inputs plus other costs (excluding labor costs and depreciation).  
Table 4. TFP estimated by ratio of output to accounting costs 
  Peasant farms  Corporate farms*  
Value of output/production costs  1.51 (n = 223)  1.29 (n = 122) 
Sales revenue/production costs  1.53 (n = 248)  1.22 (n = 143) 
*Costs for corporate farms do not include depreciation and labor. 
 18 
 
Table 4 presents the accounting-based TFP proxies calculated using these costs and two 
output variables: the value of production and the sales revenue. The results are weighted 
averages, obtained by taking the ratio of the sum total of outputs to sum total of input costs in the 
entire sample (the number of observations for each sum is shown in parentheses). The 
accounting TFP is somewhat higher for peasant farms than for corporate farms. There is no way 




Production Function Approach: TFP by Dummy Variable Estimation 
Differences in TFP between categories of farms can be captured by estimating 
appropriate production functions with a dummy variable for different farm types. If the dummy 
coefficient for type A farms is found to be greater than for type B farms, this implies that type A 
farms produce a greater value of output at any given bundle of inputs and essentially means that 
type A farms have higher TFP than type B farms. This procedure enables us to assess differences 
in TFP without actually calculating the TFP in absolute values.  
Table 5. Estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function for corporate and peasant farms 
Dependent variable: value of output („000 hrivny, logged)  Model 1: labor, land, 
machinery* 
Model 2: labor, land, 
machinery, animals** 
Explanatory variables:     
Labor (workers, logged)  0.542  0.548 
Land (ha, logged)  0.512  0.367 
Farm machinery (pieces, logged)  0.175  0.067 
Livestock (standard head, logged)  --  0.187 
Farm type (dummy): corporate relative to peasant farms  −0.249  −0.318 
R
2  0.815  0.848 
Number of observations  371  207 
* All coefficients significant at p = 0.05. Farm dummy marginally significant with p = 0.18. 
** Labor, land, and livestock significant at p = 0.05; farm machinery (p = 0.54) and farm type (p = 0.24) not 
significant. 
 
                                                 
2 Accounting-based TFP measures have been previously calculated in several studies for other transition countries. 
For a calculation of TFP as the ratio of output to the reported cost of inputs see Dudwick et al. (2005). 19 
 
A three-input Cobb-Douglas production function, relating the aggregated value of output 
to agricultural land, agricultural labor, and the number of farm machinery, was estimated on 371 
observations from the survey dataset classified into corporate and peasant farms (Table 5, Model 
1). Another model (Model 2) was estimated with the number of animals also included in the 
capital component, but at the cost of using a much smaller sample of observations (207 farms 
with a nonzero herd). In both models the dummy variable differentiated between corporate and 
peasant farms, as household plots could not be included due to missing data for labor and other 
inputs. 
In the three-input production function (Model 1), labor, land, and farm machinery have a 
highly significant positive impact on the value of production. In the four-input production 
function with livestock (Model 2), land and labor remain highly significant, but livestock takes 
over from farm machinery as the third significant factor of production in farms that have 
animals. The farm type dummy has a negative coefficient in both models (and in models with 
many other combinations of inputs that we have tried). This coefficient is only marginally 
significant (at p = 0.20) in Model 1 and not statistically significant by any acceptable measure in 
Model 2. Nevertheless, its consistently negative sign provides an indication that, for every given 
bundle of inputs, corporate farms achieve a lower value of output than peasant farms.
3 However, 
even without drawing this (statistically weak) conclusion in favor of the performance of peasant 
farms, we can definitely say that the results do not support the inherited socialist conviction 
regarding the superiority of large farm enterprises: the statistical analysis shows that corporate 
farms certainly do not outperform peasant farms. The performance of large corporate farms at 
best is comparable to the performance of the much smaller peasant farms. 
                                                 
3 The mathematics of the Cobb-Douglas production function translates the negative dummy variable coefficient of  
−0.249 in Model 1 into a difference of 22% in output between corporate farms and peasant farms for each bundle of 
inputs (1 − exp(−0.249) = 1 − 0.78 = 0.22). For Model 2 the difference is 27%. 20 
 
Production Function Approach: TFP Calculated from Factor Shares 
The estimated production function provides another technique for calculating the TFP in 
absolute values for different groups of farms. As we move from the relatively small peasant 
farms to the large corporate farms, the agricultural product increases, but so do the labor force, 
the land endowment, and the machinery pool. The production function is a mathematical 
relationship that links the increase in agricultural product with the increase in aggregated input 
use. The inputs are aggregated by applying the weights (or factor shares) from the corresponding 
production function to specific values of the inputs. TFP is calculated as the aggregated value of 
output divided by the aggregated value of inputs. In this sense it is similar to the standard partial 
productivity measures, in which the aggregated value of output is divided by the quantity of a 
single input (land or labor).  
Table 6. Regression coefficients and input weights in alternative production functions 
  Model A: labor, 
land, machinery 
Model A weights  Model B: labor, 
land, livestock 
Model B weights 
Labor  0.511  0.44  0.538  0.50 
Land  0.488  0.42  0.403  0.37 
Farm machinery  0.168  0.14  --  -- 
Livestock  --  --  0.142  0.13 
Sum of coefficients  1.167  1.00  1.083  1.00 
R
2  0.814    0.843   
Number of observations  371    215   
Note: The estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero (p< 0.01); all sums of coefficients significantly 
greater than 1. 
 
Table 6 presents the estimated production function coefficients and the weights used in 
TFP calculations (to calculate the weights the regression coefficients are divided by the sum of 
the coefficients, which in practice is not necessarily 1). Model A corresponds to Model 1 in 
Table 5, but without the farm type dummy. This is a three-input production function estimated 
for the pooled sample of corporate and peasant farms (n = 371 observations). Model B 
corresponds to Model 2 in Table 5, but it is also a three-input model with labor, land, and 
livestock: farm machinery has been omitted from the regression because its coefficient is not 21 
 
statistically significant. In both three-input production functions agricultural land accounts for 
nearly 50% of input use and labor for around 40% (see the columns for input weights in Table 
6). The third factor (machinery or livestock) accounts for less than 15% of input use. The 
aggregated value of inputs is obtained for each observation as the sum of the relevant inputs 
(labor, land, machinery or labor, land, livestock) multiplied by the respective weights from 
Table 6. The TFP is then calculated for each observation as the ratio of the value of output to the 
aggregated value of inputs. 
The mean and median TFP values obtained by this method for corporate and peasant 
farms are presented in Table 7. The numbers are very close for the two categories and the 
differences between farms of different types are not statistically significant. Regression of TFP 
on farm size as a continuous variable (measured in hectares of agricultural land) failed to detect 
any statistically significant relationship either:TFP was found to be at the same average level for 
farms of all sizes. These results are fully consistent with the previous observation that the 
dummy variable coefficient did not produce a statistically significant shift in production 
functions between corporate and peasant farms. The TFP calculations do not provide positive 
evidence in support of our hypothesis that individual (peasant) farms are more productive than 
corporate farms. On the other hand, these results establish convincingly that corporate farms are 
not better than peasant farms, and both farm types should be allowed to evolve on a level playing 
field.  
Table 7. TFP (‘000 hrivny per aggregated unit of inputs) 
  Mean  Median 
Peasant farms  Corporate 
farms 
Peasant farms  Corporate 
farms 
Model A: labor, land, machinery  2.70  2.46  1.64  1.85 
Model B: labor, land, animals  2.97  3.01  1.92  2.21 




Our approach to total factor productivity has mainly relied on estimation of production 
functions. A different approach that focuses on farm technical efficiency (rather than TFP) relies 
on the construction of production frontiers (not production functions). A production frontier is 
the locus of efficient or “best attainable” points, i.e., points where the maximum output is 
achieved for every given bundle of inputs, or alternatively every given output is achieved by the 
consumption of a minimum bundle of inputs. The production-frontier approach provides an 
alternative view that generally reinforces the TFP results obtained with production functions. 
The production frontier is constructed on the basis of available empirical data, and the 
efficient points are the “best attainable” in the sample, not in the entire conceivable population. 
Once the production frontier has been constructed, the technical efficiency of each farm is 
calculated by measuring its relative distance from the frontier. Points on the frontier are 
technically efficient; their distance from the frontier is 0, and their technical efficiency (TE) 
score is 1. As the distance of a particular point from the frontier increases, its TE score decreases. 
Each TE score is a number indicating the output that a particular farm achieves with a given 
bundle of inputs as a fraction (or a percentage) achieved by the “best performer” with the same 
bundle of inputs. For a comprehensive discussion of technical efficiency and the methodology of 
constructing production frontiers see Coelli et al. (1998). 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is a production frontier technique that is conceptually 
close to production function estimation. This is an econometric method that starts with the 
production function and then iteratively shifts it outward by a certain algorithm until a 
production frontier is obtained. The actual observed points generally fall below the frontier (in 
this sense they are inefficient). The deviation of the observed points from the frontier also 23 
 
contains a random error component because of which some points may actually fall above the 
estimated frontier (if the error component exceeds the estimated inefficiency component). The 
TE scores are calculated by taking the ratio of the actual output of each farm (adjusted for 
random errors) to the stochastic frontier output for the corresponding bundle of inputs. A detailed 
description of the SFA algorithm can be found in Coelli et al. (1998). 
For Ukraine we could only analyze the technical efficiency of corporate and peasant 
farms, because there were practically no labor data for the small household plots (see Table 2).  
The SFA algorithm was applied to construct three stochastic frontiers: a frontier with only two 
inputs (land and workers), a frontier with three inputs (land, workers, and number of farm 
machinery), and finally a frontier with four inputs (including also livestock). The number of 
valid observations decreased as the number of inputs was increased (Table 8). As the output in 
all three models we used the value of production calculated on the basis of survey data.  
Table 8. TE scores for farms of different organizational forms 






Two inputs: land and workers  398  0.719*  0.685* 
Three inputs: land, workers, number of machines  371  0.714*  0.684* 
Four inputs: land, workers, machinery, livestock   207  0.710  0.687 
Note: TE scores estimated by SFA with organizational form as Z factor. 
*Differences in TE scores statistically significant at p = 0.01. 
 
In all three models, the TE scores for corporate farms were higher than those for peasant 
farms (contrary to our hypothesis), but in the four-input model the difference between 
organizational forms was not statistically significant. The conclusion is basically the same as for 
TFP calculations above. The overall situation is similar to that observed previously for Russia 
(see Brock et al. (2007)), where peasant farms did not outperform corporate farms and only 
household plots (missing from the Ukrainian analysis) had higher TE scores.  
The frequency distribution of the SFA efficiency scores for Ukraine (Figure 3) on the 
whole is similar to that for Russia, with most farms bunching fairly close to 1 (the mode is at 24 
 
0.72-0.80 in all three models). Because of lack of statistical significance in the differences 
between corporate and peasant farms, the distributions for the two organizational forms cannot 
be resolved into two distinct histograms. 
 
Figure 3. Frequency distribution of technical efficiency scores for corporate and peasant farms (SFA with four 
inputs: land, workers, machinery, and livestock). Source: 2005 FAO survey. 
 
Conclusions 
We did not observe clear-cut performance differences between large corporate farms and the 
much  smaller  peasant  farms  (unfortunately  no  comprehensive  performance  data  on  the  very 
small household plots were available for Ukraine). The information available from the 2005 
FAO farm survey in Ukraine did not provide convincing and unambiguous evidence in support 
of the basic hypothesis of reform advocates, namely that the individual farms arising in the 
process of reform are more efficient than the conservative corporate farms. These results are 
somewhat surprising, because they contradict recent findings for both Moldova (Lerman and 
Sutton 2006) and the United States (Ahearn et al. 2002), where smaller farms achieved higher 
TFP than larger farms, providing an indication of diseconomies of size.  
Our conclusion for Ukraine at this stage is limited to a more modest result, namely that 
we do not observe economies of size operating among Ukrainian farms. The conclusion in itself 









has important implications in a country where the traditional mindset among agricultural policy-
makers is that “large is beautiful”. Based on our findings, there is no justification for continuing 
policies that favor large corporate farms over smaller family farms. The government of Ukraine 
should  abandon  its  inherited  preference  for  large-scale  corporate  farms  and  concentrate  on 
policies to improve the operating conditions for small individual farms. All types of farms should 
be  allowed  to  evolve  on  a  level  playing  field,  as  they  normally  do  in  established  market 
economies.  Continuing  the  transformation  from  largely  corporate  to  largely  individual  farm 
structure  in  line  with  the  patterns  characteristic  of  market  economies  can  be  expected  to 
strengthen the beneficial effects for Ukrainian agriculture that are beginning to be noticeable 
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